On March 4, 2025, the US Department of State announced the redesignation of Ansarallah (a political movement and militia group in Yemen also known as the Houthis) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”). The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) separately designated seven high-ranking members of Ansarallah as Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) for smuggling weapons into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and negotiating weapons procurement from Russia. In addition, OFAC designated one individual for involvement in smuggling Yemeni people to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine.
The redesignation of Ansarallah as an FTO implicates additional criminal law risks associated with dealing with FTOs and may have potential impact on humanitarian-related activities.
Background and Impact of FTO Redesignation
The FTO redesignation was made pursuant to President Trump’s January 22, 2025 Executive Order (“EO”) 14175 directing the Secretary of State to submit a report on the designation of Ansarallah as a terrorist organization and to then take “all appropriate action” with regard to designation of Ansarallah as a terrorist organization. EO 14175 also requires that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (“USAID”) jointly review of UN partners, NGOs, and contractors through which USAID works in Yemen and identify and take action to terminate projects, grants, or contracts with any entities that either: (i) made payments to Ansarallah members or government entities; or (ii) have criticized international efforts to counter Ansarallah while “failing to document [its] abuses sufficiently.”
Ansarallah’s US sanctions status has varied under recent US administrations. In January 2021, the outgoing first Trump administration designated Ansarallah as an FTO and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) only for those designations to be revoked a month later by the incoming Biden administration over concerns that they would impede humanitarian aid to the Yemeni people. However, the Biden administration partially reversed course and redesignated Ansarallah as an SDGT (but not an FTO) in February 2024 following increased Ansarallah attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Although both SDGT and FTO designations carry similar consequences, an FTO designation is more severe because US federal law (the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) makes it a crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to an FTO. In addition, financial institutions are required to freeze and report any funds that they become aware of in which an FTO or its agent has an interest. Knowing failure to do so can result in civil penalties for the financial institution. The US government seeks to enforce these prohibitions extraterritorially.
Amended General Licenses
On March 5, 2025, OFAC published amended versions of six general licenses (“GLs”) it issued when Ansarallah was designated as an SDGT in February 2024.
- GL 22A – There was no material change to this ag/med GL other than to add references to the Foreign Terrorist Organization Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (“FTOSR”).
- GL 23A – This GL no longer authorizes transactions involving Ansarallah with respect to receipt or transmission of telecommunications “to or from” Yemen, only “within” Yemen. It also adds voice over internet protocol (VOIP) to the list of authorized services, software, hardware, or technology.
- GL 24A – There was no material change to this GL authorizing personal remittances involving Ansarallah other than adding references to the FTOSR.
- GL 25A – This GL previously authorized transactions related to refined petroleum products for personal, commercial, or humanitarian use in Yemen. This GL is now being wound down and has been narrowed in scope from “provision (including sale)” of refined petroleum products to “delivery and offloading,” provided such products were loaded onto a vessel prior to March 5, 2025. GL 25A expires at 12:01 a.m. EDT on April 4, 2025.
- GL 26A – This GL, which previously authorized transactions involving Ansarallah that were ordinarily incident and necessary to the operation of, or the import or export of goods or transit of passengers through, ports and airports in Yemen, has been amended to make explicit that transactions involving imports or exports of refined petroleum products are not authorized (other than as noted under GL25A).
- GL 28A – There was no material change to this GL authorizing transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to official business of diplomatic or consular missions to Yemen other than adding references to the FTOSR.
Potential Impact on Humanitarian-Related Activities
The FTO redesignation and changes to the GLs are summarized in OFAC FAQ 1219, which also notes that OFAC has removed its Compliance Communiqué: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian-Related Assistance and Critical Commodities to the Yemeni People, which reassured private-sector shippers and nongovernmental and humanitarian actors that Ansarallah’s SDGT designation did not amount to sanctions on Yemen and was not intended to prevent assistance to, and trade with, the Yemeni people (see our previous blog here). Parties engaging in humanitarian-related transactions involving Yemen will instead need to consult the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (“GTSR”), the FTOSR, OFAC’s Supplemental Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, and FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, and the various GLs discussed above to determine the scope of humanitarian-related activities authorized with respect to Yemen and Ansarallah.
US person NGOs or personnel may be able to continue to rely on the GTSR NGO GL and the FTOSR NGO GL. FAQ 1219 indicates that non-US persons will not expose themselves to secondary sanctions risk if they engage in or facilitate transactions for which a US person would not require a specific license under the GTSR or FTOSR.
