On June 30, 2025, the White House reissued National Security Presidential Memorandum-5 (“2025 NSPM-5”) focused on Cuba policy that it published in largely the same form in the first Trump Administration (see the “2017 NSPM-5”).  As acknowledged in Section 4(a) of the reissued document, much of the contents of the 2025 NSPM-5 was already implemented in the first Trump Administration pursuant to the 2017 NSPM-5.  Along with 2025 NSPM-5, the White House issued a related fact sheet.

The first steps taken pursuant to the 2025 NSPM-5 will involve additions of Cuban hotels to the Cuba Restricted List (“CRL”) and Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List (“CPAL”).  The US State Department’s website already has the updated lists, with the additions taking effect on July 14, 2025.  The advanced publication version of the notices in the Federal Register related to these changes are available here for the CRL and here for the CPAL.

In addition, the 2025 NSPM-5 is likely to be the policy basis to reverse the marginal changes that the Biden Administration implemented in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”).  The Trump Administration has already reversed some of the Cuba policy changes made in the final days of the Biden Administration, as we discussed in our recent blog posts here and here.

Biden-era changes to the CACR that may be reversed by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) include:

  • a general license for US parties to travel to Cuba to attend or organize professional meetings or conferences in Cuba, pursuant to CACR Section 515.564;
  • a general license for US parties to travel to Cuba for group people-to-people educational travel that takes place under the auspices of an organization subject to the CACR, pursuant to CACR Section 515.565;
  • monetary limits on certain types of remittances to Cuba, pursuant to CACR Section 515.570(a); and
  • a general license that authorizes US banks to process Cuba-related “U-Turn” payments conducted by parties not subject to the CACR, pursuant to CACR Section 515.584(d).

Until OFAC amends the CACR to make one or more of these changes, these Biden-era authorizations remain in effect.

Lastly, the 2025 NSPM-5 does not instruct the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to amend or strengthen US export controls targeting Cuba.

The authors acknowledge the contributions of Jack Curtin to the preparation of this post.

Author

Washington, DC

Author

Washington, DC