On January 6, 2020, the US Department of State’s US Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) published a set of Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) (available here), which provide long-awaited clarifications regarding the registration and authorization requirements of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) applicable to the provision of defense services abroad by natural US persons employed by foreign persons. The main points are summarized below: The FAQs clarify that no registration with DDTC is…
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), the US State Department (“State”), and the US Commerce Department (“Commerce”) issued rules adjusting maximum civil monetary penalties (“CMPs”) under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015 (“FCA”).
Alexandre Lamy published an article, “Supply Chain Risks Related to US Sanctions and Export Control Issues,” in the February 2019 issue of Baker McKenzie’s “Aerospace & Defense Compliance Bulletin.” The text of that article is provided below.
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Supply Chain Risks Related to US Sanctions and Export Control Issues
When companies and compliance departments think about US sanctions and export control risks, they often focus on sales to customers and exports/reexports from one country to another. In that context, the compliance focus is typically on confirming that a customer and other parties involved in a sale and shipment are not restricted parties and that the transfer of a product is authorized under applicable export-control regulations. This is only half the story. Companies can have similar risks in their supply chain, which can be disruptive to a company’s operations beyond one transaction or customer relationship if not property managed.
On August 24, 2018, the US State Department gave notice of new sanctions on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (the “CBW Act”) after determining that the Russian Government has used chemical weapons in violation of international law or chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals. The imposition of CBW Act sanctions follows reports of the use of a “Novichok” nerve agent in an attempt to assassinate UK citizen Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal. There is no indication in the notice regarding the potential for significant additional sanctions (e.g., an export ban, an import ban, an air transportation ban) to be imposed in three months time, as previously described here.