On 29 October 2025 and after more than three months, Switzerland finalized the implementation of the EU’s 18th sanctions package by updating the Ordinance on measures in connection with the situation in Ukraine (“Ukraine Ordinance”; see press release here). At the same day, the Federal Council also introduced new measures against Belarus by revising the Ordinance on measures against Belarus (“Belarus Ordinance”). These new measures (with one exception) entered into force on 30 October 2025 and conclude Switzerland’s implementation of the EU’s 18th sanctions package – the listings and related measures under the 18th package had already been adopted by the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER) on 12 August 2024 (see media release here; see our blog post on this topic here). Furthermore, the EAER updated the Interpretation Guide for Sanctions Measures (Auslegungshilfe für Sanktionsmassnahmen), with all changes visible in correction mode (both clean version and version in correction mode available here).

1. New sanctions against Russia

New trade restrictions

  • Newly restricted goods: A significant number of new items were listed, most notably in Annex 1 of the Ukraine Ordinance (goods for military and technological strengthening or for the development of the defense and security sector) and Annex 23 of the Ukraine Ordinance (goods for industrial strengthening). These newly listed goods include, most notably, constituent chemicals for propellants and certain metals and plastics.
  • Grace periods: A grace period (or grandfathering period) was introduced in Art. 35 paras. 11 and 12 of the Ukraine Ordinance for items listed in Sections 2 and 3 of Annex 23 of the Ukraine Ordinance, allowing transactions entered into before 30 October 2025 to be completed by 31 January 2026 without being subject to the applicable restrictions.
  • New licensing grounds: Several of the items newly included in Annex 23 of the Ukraine Ordinance are ingredients, materials or machines that may also be included in or used for foodstuff, household goods and pharmaceuticals. Considering this, Art. 11a para. 5 of the Ukraine Ordinance has been expanded to include new licensing grounds for specific items (listed by their respective custom tariff numbers; letters h to m).
  • New SECO information and licensing competence: Finally, the revised Ukraine Ordinance introduces a new information and licensing competence of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs – SECO with regards to items listed in Annex 1 of the Ukraine Ordinance. According to new Art. 5 para. 1ter of the Ukraine Ordinance, if SECO has information that goods listed in Annex 1 intended for export to third countries outside the European Economic Area (“EEA”) are to be exported in whole or in part to the Russian Federation or could be used there, it may (proactively) inform the exporters accordingly. In this case, the export of such goods becomes subject to a license. This new measure aims at addressing the risk of circumvention of existing trade restrictions via third countries and corresponds to the “catch-all provision” introduced by the EU (see our Blog article about EU’s 18th Russia Sanctions Package here).

New restrictions in the financial sector

  • Transaction ban on state-owned companies: The prohibition of conducting business with state-owned companies has been specified, now covering banks, companies and organizations domiciled outside Switzerland or the EEA that are directly or indirectly owned by more than 50% by any of the entities listed in Annex 15 (Art. 24a para. 1 let. b of the Ukraine Ordinance; previous wording: “controlled by more than 50%”).
  • Transaction ban on RDIF: The existing ban on investing in projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) in Art. 26 of the Ukraine Ordinance has been extended to a complete ban on all transactions with the RDIF, its sub-funds and associated companies. A new licensing ground has been introduced for the trade of pharmaceutical products and medical devices (Art. 26 para. 3 of the Ukraine Ordinance). The existing licensing ground applying to contracts entered into before 5 March 2022 also applies to the new ban on transactions (Art. 26 para. 4 of the Ukraine Ordinance). SECO may grant exemptions from this transaction ban until 31 December 2026, if this is necessary for the withdrawal of investments and the withdrawal from the Russian Federation or the termination of business activities in the Russian Federation (Art. 30cquarter of the Ukraine Ordinance).
  • Transaction ban on banks:
    • The previous ban on the provision of specialized financial messaging services in old Art. 27 of the Ukraine Ordinance was considerably extended to a complete transaction ban with the banks listed in Annex 14 of the Ukraine Ordinance. According to new Art. 27 of the Ukraine Ordinance, any direct or indirect transactions with such listed banks, companies or organizations, or entities owned by such listed banks, companies and organizations, are prohibited. In its press release, the Federal Council pointed out that it is not currently applying this transaction ban to two Chinese regional banks (Suifenhe Rural Commercial Bank und Heihe Rural Commercial Bank) that fall under the EU’s equivalent transaction ban, because there is no evidence suggesting that Swiss financial institutions are conducting business with these banks.
    • SECO may further grant exemptions from the transaction ban if this is necessary for the withdrawal of investments from the Russian Federation or the termination of business activities in the Russian Federation (Art. 30cquinquies of the Ukraine Ordinance).

New restrictions in the energy sector

  • Transaction ban targeting Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2: Newly introduced Art. 24abis of the Ukraine Ordinance prohibits conducting business in connection with the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. Specifically, transactions serving the completion, operation, maintenance or use of the pipelines, or the financing of these transactions, are prohibited (Art. Art. 24abis para. 1 of the Ukraine Ordinance).
  • Import ban on refined petroleum products: In its press release, the Federal Council also announced the introduction of a ban on the purchase, import, transit or transport of refined petroleum products obtained from Russian crude oil in third countries – with the exception of Canada, the EEA, the United Kingdom and the United States. This new measure will be included under new Art. 12abis of the Ukraine Ordinance but is subject to the same transitional period applied under the EU’s 18th package. This import ban will accordingly enter into force on 21 January 2026.

Further measures

  • Exception to transaction ban with ports and airports: A new exception to the transaction ban involving listed ports and airports was included in Art. 24d para. 2 let. j of the Ukraine Ordinance regarding the purchase, import, and transport of coal (HS Code 2701), provided that it does not originate from the Russian Federation, is not Russian-owned, and is only loaded in the Russian Federation, exported from the Russian Federation, or transported through the Russian Federation. In addition, a further licensing ground was included under the same transaction ban for the establishment and maintenance of civil nuclear capabilities (Art. 24d para. 3 let. h of the Ukraine Ordinance).
  • New software restrictions: Software used in the banking and finance sector (e.g., for online-banking or ATMs) has been added to the so-called software and services ban in Art. 28e para. 1quarter of the Ukraine Ordinance. It is now subject to restrictions on sale, export, transport, and supply to the Russian government, entities in Russia or listed territories in Annex 6 of the Ukraine Ordinance. Similarly, its transit through Switzerland is prohibited. This new restriction does not apply to the supply of such software for specific uses in the banking and financial sector insofar as this is necessary to fulfil contracts concluded before 30 October 2025 and executed by 31 January 2026 (Art. 35 para. 39 of the Ukraine Ordinance).
  • Non-recognition of Investor-State Dispute Judgments: Pursuant to new Art. 30g of the Ukraine Ordinance, Switzerland does not recognize or enforce any foreign judgments, decisions, or penalties or sanctions from proceedings outside Switzerland or an EEA member state, if they arise from investor-state dispute settlement proceedings against Switzerland or an EEA member state and are based on claims related to measures under the Ukraine Ordinance or equivalent EEA measures. This applies specifically to claims made by sanctioned individuals, companies, or organizations, or entities they own or control. Additionally, requests for legal assistance and enforcement of penalties or sanctions from such proceedings are rejected under the same conditions.
  • Right to claim damages from investor-state disputes: New Art. 30h of the Ukraine Ordinance enshrines the Swiss Confederation’s right to claim compensation for any direct or indirect damages, including legal costs, resulting from investor-state dispute settlement proceedings initiated against Switzerland due to measures under the Ukraine Ordinance.
  • Non-implementation of notification requirement: In its 12th sanctions package, the EU had introduced a notification requirement for the transfer of funds out of the EU from EU-based companies controlled by Russians or by individuals or entities established in Russia. When implementing this package in January 2024, the Federal Council decided to hold off on introducing a similar requirement pending further review. On 29 October 2025, the Federal Council made its final decision not to introduce this notification requirement.

2. New sanctions against Belarus

The Federal Council has fully adopted all measures implemented against Belarus by the EU under the 18th sanctions package into the Belarus Ordinance, which mirror the Russia sanctions to a certain extent:

  • Newly restricted goods: New items were listed under various Annexes of the Belarus Ordinance, including most notably under Annex 3 of the Belarus Ordinance (goods for military and technological strengthening or for the development of the defense and security sector) and Annex 19 (goods for industrial strengthening) of the Belarus Ordinance.
  • Import ban on military items: A new prohibition on the purchase, procurement, import, and transit of all types of military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and components, accessories, and spare parts for such equipment, from or originating in Belarus was introduced (Art. 2 para. 2ter of the Belarus Ordinance). This prohibition does not apply to spare parts and services that are necessary for the maintenance, repair, and preservation of existing military capabilities of Switzerland or an EEA member state (Art. 2 para. 4bis of the Belarus Ordinance).
  • SECO information and licensing competence: The introduction of the same information and licensing-competence of SECO as noted under the Ukraine Ordinance above (Art. 5 para. 4 of the Belarus Ordinance).
  • Transaction ban for banks: As noted under the Ukraine Ordinance above, a total transaction ban in relation to banks listed in Annex 15 of the Belarus Ordinance was introduced in revised Art. 23 of the Belarus Ordinance.
  • Measures related to Investor-State Disputes: As noted under the Ukraine Ordinance above, new Art. 27d of the Belarus Ordinance stipulates the non-recognition and non-enforcement of judgments and refusal of requests for legal assistance in relation to investor-state disputes related to sanctions on Belarus, whilst new Art. 27e of the Belarus Ordinance sets out Switzerland’s right to claim damages deriving from such disputes.

3. Looking Ahead

The delay of over three months in Switzerland’s implementation of the EU’s 18th sanctions package was considerable and has showcased lobbying efforts surrounding the newly listed goods and the broader trade challenges Switzerland currently faces. These factors mainly contributed to the protracted timeline. It is therefore all the more noteworthy, yet not surprising, that Switzerland has finally opted to fully align with the EU’s measures as it has done previously on key measures – albeit with the notable exception of the listing of two Chinese regional banks, a decision that likely reflects Switzerland’s cautious approach to its China relations while being explained pragmatically by the lack of relevance for Swiss financial institutions.

Nonetheless, Swiss companies remain caught in a state of legal uncertainty. The divergence between the Swiss and EU sanctions regimes continues to create operational and compliance challenges, as the EU has already moved ahead with its 19th sanctions package where Switzerland in a first step will typically follow suit with listings thereunder. It remains to be seen how swiftly Switzerland will follow suit, and whether future implementations will reflect a more synchronized approach or continue to be shaped by domestic considerations and geopolitical sensitivities.